Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 5 (1983) 195-207
North-Holland

195

THE BELGIAN BILL TO AMEND THE CORPORATION LAW - NEW
PERSPECTIVES FOR BELGIAN SECURITIES REGULATION

Claude LEMPEREUR

*

1. Introduction
In late 1979, the Belgian Government submitted a comprehensive bill to
amend the nation's company law for Parliamentary approval [1]. The proposal
reflects 30 years of work which began in 1952, when the Government first
appointed a commission to consider revisions. Though the bill itself proposes
changes throughout the company law, this article focuses on the measures
relating to creation of new types of securities, issuance of bonds, petitions for
proxies, requirements regarding disclosure of information, and prevention of
insider trading.
Before examining the particular areas of revision, three salient characteristics of the bill should be noted. First, the preparation of the bill was guided by
studies of foreign law [2], and many of the proposals have been developed from
this perspective [3]. The explanatory memorandum preceding the bill includes
numerous references to French and German laws, as well as to Dutch, Italian,
Swiss, English, and American laws [4]. The influence of comparative law is in
large part the result of the presence of comparative law scholars on the
commission that drafted the bill.
A second characteristic of the bill is that the drafters took into account
developments in the European Economic Community (EEC) with respect to
the harmonization of company law. The advantage of this approach is that the
bill's provisions incorporate changes in the law which the drafters anticipated
would be required under future EEC directives, thus reducing the likelihood
that further changes will be needed. This advantage, however, may be limited.
Efforts to harmonize company law within the EEC have progressed and shifted
course since 1971, by which time the major provisions of the Belgian bill had
already been drafted. Thus, the final directives of the EEC frequently differ
greatly from the draft versions upon which the proposed Belgian provisions
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were based. The bill is therefore not entirely consistent with the Second, Third,
and Fourth Directives [5].
A third notable characteristic of the bill is that recommendations of the
Banking Commission, an administrative agency responsible for banking and
securities regulation, influenced many of its provisions [6]. This influence may
be attributed to three factors: the wide acceptance of its recommendations [7];
the presence of a Banking Commission representative both on the commission
officially appointed to formulate the preliminary draft of the bill and on the
later committee which prepared draft amendments; and the Commission's
early and continuing activity with the Government in the field of minority
shareholder protection reform.

2. New types of securities
The bill provides for the creation of three new types of securities: non-voting shares, subscription bonds, and variable capital company shares.
2.1. Non-voting shares
Under current Belgian law, all owners of capital stock are entitled to vote.
While the bill acknowledges this principle, it follows the practice of other
countries by permitting non-voting shares to be issued under certain conditions
[8]. The explanatory memorandum indicates that the purpose of this provision
is to facilitate access to capital markets by medium size businesses; the
provision would permit them to receive new capital without imperiling the
stability of management by modifying the structure of their voting stock.
Under the bill, the decision to issue non-voting shares must be made at a
general shareholders' meeting. Due to the special nature of the transaction, the
bill requires that the Board of Directors prepare a special report for the
shareholders' meeting detailing the purpose of and justification for the issue of
non-voting shares. In certain instances, the information in this report must also
be submitted to the Banking Commission [9].
Non-voting shares may be issued subject to the following conditions.
(1) They may not represent more than one-third of the capital of the
company.
(2) They must carry preferential dividend rights of 5% of their book or
nominal value. The Articles of Incorporation may also provide for dividends in
excess of the foregoing.
(3) In the event of a winding up, non-voting shareholders must be repaid
their contributions before voting shareholders are permitted to participate in
the liquidation. In addition, if the Articles of Incorporation so provide,
non-voting shareholders may have the right to share in any liquidation surplus.
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If the rights provided for in the bill are not granted or are subsequently
revoked, the holders of non-voting stock automatically receive voting rights,
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary. Moreover, the holders of
non-voting shares are entitled to vote as a special class on any matter affecting
their rights and such rights can be modified only upon such a vote [10].
If a subsequent issue of non-voting stock is being contemplated, the
proposed law would require that senior holders of non-voting shares have the
right to vote at the general shareholders' meeting convened to consider the
issue [I I]. If the issue is approved, senior shareholders of non-voting stock
would acquire pre-emptive subscription rights to newly authorized non-voting
stock [12]. However, if the new shares are to carry voting rights, the holders of
non-voting stock would acquire neither voting nor such pre-emptive subscription rights.
2.2. Subscription bonds (warrants)
Belgian.law currently permits the issuance of bonds convertible into shares
and bonds carrying subscription rights to purchase shares in the future at a
fixed price [13]. The bill would augment existing law by providing for the issue
of subscription rights as independent securities, enabling investors to secure
the right to purchase shares in the future without purchasing debt instruments
[14]. One of the advantages of the amendment is that it enables the company to
achieve these purposes without issuing founders shares, thus avoiding the
issuance of a second class of stock, which is the only presently available
alternative [15].
The proposed reforms would permit a company to issue subscription bonds
in registered or bearer form, if authorized to do so under its Articles of
Incorporation and if it has not already issued founders shares. The duration of
the subscription rights may not exceed ten years from the date of the
company's formation or from the date of the general shareholders' meeting
that approved the issue of the bonds, whichever is later. The terms under which
the bonds are issued must include the date of subscription, the issue price of
new shares, and the duration of the subscription rights.
As is the case with non-voting share issues, the Board of Directors must
prepare a detailed report on the bond issue for the general meeting; in certain
cases this report must also be submitted to the Banking Commission. In
addition, because the problems of protecting subscription bondholders are the
same as those connected with the issue of convertible bonds or bonds with
subscription rights, certain provisions relating to the latter types of bonds
apply to subscription bonds as well [16]. For example, as of the date the
subscription bonds are issued, the company may not enter into any transaction
that would reduce any of the bondholders' rights unless the holders' other
rights are adjusted accordingly. When capital stock is to be increased, bond-
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holders may exercise their subscription rights, notwithstanding any clause to
the contrary. As stockholders, they will then be vested with the same pre-emptive rights as the other stockholders and may participate in the issue of new
stock to the same extent as these other stockholders.
2.3. Stocks of variable capital companies
The bill creates a new form of commercial company: the variable capital
company [17]. The organizational structure of the variable capital company is
largely based upon the cooperative company or society. However, in order to
prevent the recurrence of past abuses which flourished under the cooperative
company form, the new variable capital company utilizes elements of the joint
stock company and the private limited liability company.
The cooperative company is characterized by the fact that its capital varies
automatically according to the admissions and exits of its members, by the
active participation of its members in the company's business, and by the
limitation placed on transfers of shares to non-members. These characteristics,
however, are not formulated in the existing law. This omission led to abuses
which the variable capital company, by formally incorporating these characteristics into its definition, is designed to eliminate. In the past, companies
organized as cooperatives but permitted individuals not actively involved in the
company's operations to purchase and withdraw shares, contrary to the
principles underlying cooperative societies. Despite these historical abuses, the
drafters of the bill thought it necessary to maintain the possibility of a
company form in which the variability of capital would permit the entry and
exit of associates. Neverthess, because the philosophy underlying this form of
enterprise is that persons involved in the undertaking share a common purpose
or similar bond, the rules regulating the admission and departure of associates
and limiting the transferability of shares are strict [18]. Certain other rules
pertaining to variable capital companies are borrowed from those governing
joint stock companies and private limited liability companies.
The limitations on the negotiability of shares of a variable capital company
will normally prevent shares from being listed on stock exchanges. Public
subscription of company shares, however, is not prohibited. Companies selling
their shares publicly are subject to regulations that for the most part are taken
from those applicable to joint stock companies.

3. Some new rules for the issue of bonds
The bill significantly modifies existing rules relating to the issue of bonds.
The principal innovation is provision for the appointment of a trustee to
exercise certain rights of bondholders, as in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and
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the Anglo-Saxon nations [19]. Bondholders whose securities have been issued
in the same offering form a group or assembly. When there are several classes
of bonds, each class of bondholders will be grouped separately. Although the
assemblies may meet together for the purpose of a vote, they vote by class.
These groups operate to protect the interests of bondholders. They do not,
however, have the status of a separate legal entity.
The resulting system is composed of a group representative, the assembly or
assemblies of the bondholders, and the individual bondholders. According to
the issue involved, the law divides the decision-making responsibility for
questions involving bondholders' interests among the three groups, with the
group representative responsible for making certain decisions, the assembly for
certain others, and the individual bondholders for still others. The bill assigns
the respective decision-making powers among the three groups [20].
The group representative may be appointed by the company issuing the
bonds, chosen at the general meeting of the bondholders, or appointed by the
Commercial Court. The representative is the authorized agent of the bondholders even though his salary is paid by the company. Although the same
representative may represent several classes of bonds, he may sometimes act on
behalf of one class, and at other times, on behalf of another. The organization
and operation of the bondholders' assembly is modelled on those of the
shareholders' meeting. Administrative costs of the assembly are borne either by
the company or by the assembly itself. The purpose of this amendment is to
establish a system, by means of a legal determination, which sets forth the
respective powers of the representative, the assembly, and the individual
bondholders as regards particular issues.

4. Petitions for proxies
Public petitions for proxies are rare in Belgium. Nevertheless, because
several such requests have been made, the authors of the bill incorporated
provisions to protect stockholders from whom proxies are solicited. These
measures are based on the EEC's proposed Fifth Directive, which includes
specific proxy rules designed to protect shareholders' interests [21]. The provisions can be divided into two categories: proxies soliciting voting rights and
proxies soliciting rights other than voting rights.
The bill sets forth the following rules with respect to the public solicitation
of proxies for the purpose of exercising voting rights at a general shareholders'
meeting.
(1) Notwithstanding any clause to the contrary, a proxy is granted for one
meeting only or for a second meeting with the same agenda as the first one. A
proxy is always revocable.
(2) The request for a proxy must contain at least the following information:
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(a) the identity and objectives of the person requesting the proxy;
(b) a list of the documents relating to the proxy solicitation that the
shareholders may request from the company or which may be inspected at
the company's registered office (e.g. minutes of the preceding general
meetings and materials addressed to shareholders at these meetings);
(c) the agenda and the text of proposals for each of the issues on the
agenda;
(d) a request for instructions on the exercise of voting rights for each of the
issues on the agenda;
(e) the manner in which the representative will exercise the voting rights in
the absence of instructions from the shareholders.
(3) All proxies must be in writing.
(4) The voting rights must be exercised in accordance with the shareholder's
instructions or, in the absence of instructions, in the manner set forth in the
proxy request.
The representative may deviate from the foregoing if circumstances arise
that were unknown at the time the proxy was requested or at the time the
instructions were mailed and if the shareholders' interests are thereby threatened. In the event he so deviates, the representative must justify his actions to
the shareholders without delay.
The proxy rules are less rigorous when proxies are solicited from shareholders in order to exercise shareholders' rights other than voting, such as
calling for a general meeting, bringing an action against the directors, or
requesting a court to appoint an auditor-investigator. The proxy must be in
writing and the individual seeking it must inform the shareholders of his
identity, his objectives, the right he wishes to exercise, and the manner in which
he intends to do so.
In addition, an individual planning to solicit any type of proxy from
associates of a joint stock company or of a variable capital company which
have offered share subscriptions to the public, appealed for funds which are
payable on demand, or issued bonds, must inform the Banking Commission of
his intentions five days before proxies are solicited, and must submit an
appropriate dossier to the Banking Commission. If the Commission has not
been advised of the petition, has not received a dossier, or deems that either
the shareholders are not sufficiently informed or that they might be misled
regarding the identity or objectives of the soliciting party, the Commission is
authorized to so inform both the company and the soliciting party. If appropriate action is not taken by the concerned parties, the Commission may,
by a reasoned opinion appealable to the Council of State, suspend the petition
for up to three months and publicize its decision.
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5. Information provided by companies
The bill makes several changes that give shareholders greater access to
relevant information. Innovations in three areas deserve particular attention:
information available at general meetings, periodic reporting requirements, and
disclosure of information with regard to material changes.
5.1. Information availableat general meetings
The authors of the bill found that shareholders would benefit if they were
provided with special information when called to a general meeting to consider
certain specific transactions. In these instances, the Board of Directors of a
company will be required to prepare a report detailing the purpose of and
justification for the proposed transaction [22].
The special informational requirements are triggered by transactions involving:
* the issue of non-voting shares;
* the issue of subscription bonds (warrants);
" the issue of convertible bonds or bonds with subscription rights;
* the capital increase by modification of the associates' commitments;
* the modification of the essential purpose of the company;
" the modification of the legal form of the company;
" the transfer of tlie registered office to a location outside of Belgium;
" a merger with a foreign company or with a company with a different legal
form or a different essential purpose;
" a merger by absorption of another company or by the creation of a new
company;
" a dissolution in order to transfer the company's assets to another company;
* the introduction, in the ordinary course of business, of restrictions on the
free transferability of shares;
" any other fundamental changes in the company as determined by the
Articles of Incorporation.
The bill also requires the company's Board of Directors to give the Banking
Commission one month's notice before the date of the meeting, if the company
is either a joint stock company, a variable capital company, or a cooperative
company which has offered share subscriptions to the public, appealed for
funds which are payable on demand, or issued bonds. This notice must be
accompanied by the report prepared for the meeting and by a dossier drawn
up in accordance with Banking Commission regulations [23]. If the Banking
Commission is not notified, does not receive the dossier, or finds that the
report either contains insufficient information or could be misleading to the
shareholders, it will inform the company and each of its directors of the
insufficiency. If corrective action is not taken, the Commission may, by stating
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the grounds for its action, suspend the projected transaction for a maximum of
three months. The Commission may also make its decision public [24].
5.2. Periodicreporting requirements
The Royal Decree of October 8, 1976 [25], sets forth regulations governing
the preparation of the company's annual financial statement which is presented to the shareholders at the company's regularly scheduled yearly meeting. At present, however, the law does not contain any periodic reporting
requirements. The bill would change this situation by giving the King, because
of his right to regulate annual information, the right to require the managements of the types of companies listed in section 5.1 supra, to make periodic
reports to their shareholders. In exercising this right, the King will also be
responsible for determining reporting dates and methods of distributing the
required information. The King also has the power to issue exemptions and to
authorize variations from these procedures.
5.3. Disclosure of information with regardto materialchanges
In anticipation of the EEC directive regulating admission to stock exchanges, the bill directs the Boards of Directors of listed companies to
publicize, without delay, any fact or decision which could materially influence
the company's stock price. This obligation, however, does not apply if publicizing such information could prejudice the company. In addition, if the Banking
Commission learns of an undisclosed material fact or decision, it may require
the company to make such information public according to the terms set forth
by the Banking Commission. If in such a case the company does not comply
with the Banking Commission's order, the Commission may publicize the
information itself [26].
6. Insider trading
The authors of the bill were concerned that the obligation to disclose
material information as it developed would not be sufficient to prevent insider
trading. Therefore, the bill specifically prohibits persons working for a company or having contacts within a company from engaging in transactions on
the basis of such still-privileged information [27].
The first constraint prohibits holders of privileged information from acquiring or transferring securities on the basis of that information. In an action
against an inside trader, the Public Prosecutor must prove that the defendant
had privileged information and that he used it; conviction under this section
does not require the Prosecutor to prove speculative intent or an attempt to
realize a profit or avoid a loss.
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Second, insiders may not pass privileged information to a third party. This
prohibition assumes that the intent in passing privileged information is to
benefit the third party before the information becomes public.
Third, insiders may not, on the basis of privileged information, recommend
the purchase or sale of securities to a third party. Although this prohibition
relates to the second in that both address situations in which a third party
benefits from privileged information, it differs in that only the recommendation and not the privileged information itself is transmitted to the third party
[28].
There is an important exception to the prohibitions against insider trading.
Although the bill makes no distinction between transfers or acquisitions on or
off the stock exchange [29], current Belgian securities law does make such a
distinction. Under Belgian stock exchange regulations, transactions in listed
securities must be executed in the stock exchange. There are, however, two
exceptions to that rule under Belgian securities law: transactions in which the
value of the securities transferred is at least ten million Belgian francs and
transactions involving only parties not habitually engaged in off-the-market
transfers [30].
In order to make the bill consistent with current Belgian securities law, the
bill's prohibitions against insider trading are inapplicable to transactions
outside the exchange where one party holds privileged information, so long as
that information is conveyed to the other party before the transaction is
completed [31].
The authors of the bill have attempted to stress the gravity of illegal insider
trading, particularly as it affects the credibility of the stock market. They have
provided for heavy penalties in an effort to create an effective deterrent [32].
The bill subjects the offender to the same penalties set forth in the Penal Code
for breach of confidence. These penalties include imprisonment from one
month to five years and fines ranging from twenty-six to five hundred Belgian
francs, multiplied by a number, currently sixty, which offsets devaluation of
the Belgian franc.
The explanatory memorandum adds that by assimilating insider trading
with the crime of breach of confidence, professional sanctions [33], and the
application of international conventions on the cooperation of judicial authorities [34] will also be available for use against the offender.
To ensure that the risks of violating the law are not outweighed by potential
profits from insider trading, the bill makes the insider liable for a sum
corresponding to the profit directly or indirectly acquired from the offense.
The other party may also petition for the recision of the transaction.
The explanatory memorandum points out that prohibitions against insider
trading would be more effective if factors such as the internationalization of
business life were taken into account. In fashioning remedies, the bill's authors
were particularly concerned about pr9blems of enforcement that might arise
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when orders are received from abroad. For example, in the case of an order
transmitted to a Belgian stockbroker through an intermediary residing abroad,
Belgian judicial authorities would be unable to pursue the intermediary under
current law. The bill removes this obstacle by providing that the judicial
authorities may require the person residing abroad to divulge the name and
address of the person who gave him the order. This information will in turn
permit the courts to pursue the offender, who would have otherwise remained
unknown to them [35]. The bill's authors have accomplished this objective by
devising a procedure which reconciles the needs for efficiency, speed, and
justice for the accused [36].
If sufficient prima facie evidence exists that an offense has been committed
and if one or more buy or sell orders have been transmitted to Belgium
through an intermediary residing abroad, the court having jurisdiction over the
stock exchange in which the order was executed may order the intermediary to
divulge, within a fixed amount of time, the name(s) and address(es) of the
person(s) who gave him the order(s). If such information is not forthcoming,
and upon request of the Public Prosecutor, the court may prohibit the
execution in Belgium of all orders transmitted through the intermediary for a
period of one to ten years. The judgment pronouncing the prohibition shall be
published by extract at the expense of the intermediary in the Moniteur Belge
and in at least two daily newspapers. The text of the bill specifies the
references that must be contained in the exfract. Upon such publication, it
becomes unlawful for any persons to collaborate in any way in the execution of
orders transmitted by the censured individual.

7. Conclusion
In preparing their recommendations revising the Belgian securities laws as
regards bond issues, the creation of new types of proxies, information disclosure, and insider trading, the authors of the bill have attempted to deal with
current objectives and past abuses in a way which meets a dual objective:
satisfaction of immediate domestic needs and incorporation, insofar as is
possible, of projected needs expected to arise when the harmonization of EEC
law is complete. Recent comparative law studies and Banking Commission
recommendations have also had a significant impact in shaping the bill.
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Notes
[I] Doc. Ch. 387 (1979-1980) no. 1. Company law is set forth in the Code the commerce
[hereinafter cited as C. Com.], Tome I Les Codes Larcier Livre I, Titre IX (1980).
[2] See, e.g., Ch. del Marmol, L'achat par une soci&t anonynte de ses propres actions, Revue
pratique des Soci&s, 1955, at 237 et seq.
[3] P. van Ommeslaghe, La rJforrnedes socigtds anonymes, Epargner et investir, July-August
1965, at 3.
[4] See E. Stein, Harmonization of European Company Laws (1971) at 128 ei seq.
[51 Separate bills for implementing the Second and Fourth Directives are presently pending in
Parliament (Doc. Ch. 1981-1982 no. 210 and S. 1980-1981 no. 250). It should be noted that not
all deviations have been unintentional. The bill's authors have deliberately deviated from the
provisions contemplated in the draft of the Fifth Directive: although the bill adopts the Fifth
Directive's model of a dualistic system whereby management of the company is divided between a
managing director or directors and i supervisory board, it does not incorporate the Fifth
Directives provision for employee participation in management.
[61 For information on the Banking Commission, see A. Bruyneel, The Belgian Commission
Bancaire:FunctionsandMethods, 1J. Comp. Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 187 (1978). Several examples of
Banking Commission recommendations included in the bill merit discussion. First, under the
current law, pre-emptive rights for senior shareholders are not compulsory. Suggestions to grant
these rights were disregarded when the company law was amended in 1913. The Banking
Commission, however, has for a long time recommended that senior shareholders be granted
pre-emptive rights automatically, notwithstanding the absence of any such statutory requirements.
See the Commission's Reports for 1946-1947, at 77 et seq. and 1947-1948, at 58 et seq. The bill
adopts the Commission's position, see Article 127, providing for shareholders' pre-emptive rights
and stipulating that the right may be set aside only by a vote of the general shareholders' meeting,
see the Commission's Report for 1960, at 104 et seq. The Commission also recommends that even
if pre-emptive rights are set aside, the principle of shareholder equality should be respectived, see
the Commission's Reports for 1947-1948, at 59 et seq.; 1960, at 105; and 1967, at 167 et seq. The
subscription price of the new shares should correspond to their real value, see the Commission's
Reports for 1960, at 105; 1961, at 121; and 1967, at 167. Although the latter recommendations
have not been included in the bill, their application would not be precluded if the bill is approved.
When a provision of the bill reproduces a Banking Commission recommendation in principle, the
recommendation remains valid as to the details or as to further questions which have not been
explicitly dealt with in the bill. If the bill does not treat an issue which the Commission has
reached with a recommendation, the Banking Commisssion's position remains valid as a recommendation.
In addition to granting pre-emptive rights to stockholders, the bill makes a company's
acquisition of its own shares, a practice that has long been opposed by the Banking Commission.
see, e.g., the Commission's Reports for 1947-1948, at 63 et seq. and 1966, at 131 et seq., virtually
impossible. It accomplishes this by requiring complete unanimity: the acquisition and the conditions under which it is effected must be unanimously approved by a general shareholders' meeting
at which all shareholders are present or represented. Article 87, §1.
The Banking Commission's concern with the potential abuses resulting from reciprocal
shareholdings between two companies, see the Commission's Reports for 1950-1951, at 67 el seq.,
is also reflected in the bill. Reciprocal shareholdings between parent and subsidiary companies are
prohibited, and reciprocal shareholdings between two independent companies are only permitted if
each company owns less than ten percent of the other's capital. Articles 37 and 87, §7.
Finally, the bill authorizes the issue of new shares at a price below the par value of old shares;
it responds, however, to the Commission's disapproval of the practice, see the Commission's
Report for 1947-1948, at 68 et seq., by subjecting the practice to certain special information
disclosure requirements, Article 129.
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[7] Most of the Banking Commission's recommendations have been adopted into the writings
of legal scholars and Belgian companies comply with them voluntarily. Sometimes, however, even
when a Banking Commission recommendation is not accepted by a legal writer, companies
nonetheless voluntarily comply. For example, legal writers have criticized the Banking Commission's recommendations on the private sale of controlling interests. Companies, however, have
largely followed the recommendations in the belief that even though the recommendations are
subject to legal arguments, they represent an ethical standard which should be met. It should also
be noted that these practices, with regard to Banking Commission recommendations, apply to all
its recommendations and are not limited to those related to the bill under discussion.
[8] Article 71.
[9] Article 296.
[10] Article 279.
[111 Id.
[12] Article 127.
[13] C. Com., art. 101 bis et seq., Tome I Les Codes Larcier Liv. I, Tit. IX (1980).
[14] Article 73.
[15] Founders shares are shares that do not represent assets contributed in cash or in kind and
that do not represent capital stock. They are issued to persons who have made contributions which
are not eligible to be represented by capital stock.
[16] Subscription bonds are independent rights to purchase securities; there is no underlying
debt instrument. Convertible bonds are bonds which can be transformed into securities. Bonds
with subscription rights are bonds which, although they themselves are not convertible into
securities, enable the holder to purchase securities separately according to the terms of the bond.
[17] Article 244 et seq.
[18] The authors of the bill expect that the variable capital company will be used primarily by
persons who wish to buy or sell goods in common, or to engage in research projects together or by
family members desiring to put a family undertaking into corporate form.
[19] Article 325 et seq.
[20] Article 327, art. 334, art. 338.
[21] Article 281.
[22] Article 296, §1.
[23] Information to be included in the dossier is designed to enable the Banking Commission
to gauge the sufficiency of the information included in the report. As such, the dossier may contain
information which the Commission will not require to be included in the report because it feels it
is not material from a shareholder's point of view.
(241 Article 296, §2. The system is strongly inspired by Title II of Royal Decree no. 185 of July
9, 1935, which governs the public issue of securities and the admission of securities to the stock
exchange.
[25] Article 297, §1.
[26] Id. at §2.
[27] Article 402, §2, al. I. Privileged information will trigger the trading prohibition when, if
made public, it could materially affect the price of the stock. This is the same standard as that
applied to determine the materiality of information for corporate disclosure purposes. Furthermore, what is privileged information in the context of insider trading, as in the context of material
information to be disclosed under art. 297, §2, shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. In each
instance the Court shall decide if what is asserted to be privileged information constitutes
undisclosed price-sensitive information.
128] We have indicated that the bill grants the Banking Commission certain powers with
respect to the disclosure of material information. In contrast, the Banking Commission has no
authority in the area of insider trading. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum suggests that,
given the relationship between the provisions on insider trading and disclosure of material
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information, the judicial authorities should seek the advice of the Banking Commission with
respect to legal actions involving insider trading. Doc. cit., at 164.
[29] These transactions may involve any security which is admitted to the official listing or
traded on the public sales market without regard to the legal status of the issuer under public,
private, Belgian or foreign law.
[30J Article 75, §2 of the first book, Chapter V of the Commercial Code.
[31] Article 402, §2, al. 5.
[32] Id. at §2, al. 1, 2. and 4.
[33] See royal decree no. 22 of October 24, 1934.
[34] Doc. cit., at 164.
[35] Doc. cit., at 164 et seq.
[36] Article 402, §3.
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